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ABSTRACT. I describe in this paper an ontological solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin 
with describing the Entanglement urn experiment. I restate first the Sleeping Beauty problem from a 
wider perspective than the usual opposition between halfers and thirders. I also argue that the Sleeping 
Beauty experiment is  best  modelled with the Entanglement urn.  I  draw then the consequences of 
considering that  some balls  in  the  Entanglement  urn  have  ontologically different  properties  form 
normal ones. In this context, considering a Monday-waking (drawing a red ball) leads to two different 
situations that  are assigned each a different  probability.  This  leads  to a  two-sided account of  the 
Sleeping Beauty problem. On the one hand, the first situation is handled by the argument for 1/3. On 
the other hand, the second situation corresponds to a reasoning that echoes the argument for 1/2 but 
that leads however, to different conclusions.
1. The Entanglement urn
Let us consider the following experiment. In front of you is an urn. The experimenter asks you to 
study very carefully the properties of the balls that are in the urn. You go up then to the urn and begin 
to  examine its  content carefully.  You note  first  that  the  urn contains  only red or  green balls.  By 
curiosity, you decide to take a sample of a red ball in the urn. Surprisingly, you notice that while you 
catch this red ball, another ball, but of green colour, also moves simultaneously. You decide then to 
replace the red ball in the urn and you notice that immediately, the latter green ball also springs back in 
the urn. Intrigued, you decide then to catch this green ball. You note then that the red ball also goes out 
of the urn at the same time. Furthermore, while you replace the green ball in the urn, the red ball also 
springs back at the same time at its initial position in the urn. You decide then to withdraw another red 
ball from the urn. But while it goes out of the urn, nothing else occurs. Taken aback, you decide then 
to undertake a systematic and rigorous study of all the balls in the urn. 
At the end of several hours of a meticulous examination, you are now capable of describing precisely 
the properties of the balls present in the urn. The latter contains in total 1000 red balls and 500 green 
balls. Among the red balls, 500 are completely normal balls. But 500 other red balls have completely 
astonishing properties. Indeed, each of them is linked to a different green ball. When you take away 
one of these red balls, the green ball which is associated with it also goes out at the same time of the 
urn, as though it was linked to the red ball by a magnetic force. The red ball and the green ball which 
is linked to it behave then as one single object. Indeed, if you take away the red ball from the urn, the 
linked green ball is also extracted instantly. And conversely, if you withdraw from the urn one of the 
green balls, the red ball which is linked to it goes out immediately of the urn. You even tried to destroy 
one of the balls of a linked pair of balls, and you noticed that in such case, the ball of the other colour 
which is indissociably linked to it was also destroyed instantaneously. Indeed, it appears to you that 
these pairs of balls behave as one single object. 
The functioning of this urn leaves you somewhat perplexed. In particular, your are intrigued by the 
properties of the pairs of correlated balls. After reflection, you tell yourself that the properties of the 
pairs of correlated balls are finally in all respects identical to those of two entangled quantum objects. 
The entanglement (Aspect & al. 1982) is indeed the phenomenon which links up two photons, for 
example, so that when one modifies the quantum state of one of the entangled photons, the quantum 
state of the other one is instantly modified accordingly, whatever the distance where it is situated. 
Indeed, the pair of entangled photons really behave as one and the same object. You decide to call 
“Entanglement urn” this urn with its astonishing properties. After reflection, what appears peculiar 
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with this urn, is that it includes at the same time some normal and some entangled balls. The normal 
red balls have nothing different with our familiar balls. But entangled balls behave in a completely 
different way. What is amazing, you think, is that nothing seemingly differentiates the normal red balls 
from the red entangled ones. You tell yourself finally that it could be confusing.
Your reflection on the pairs of entangled balls and their properties also leads you to question the way 
the balls which compose the pairs of entangled balls are to be counted. Are they counted as normal 
balls? Or do specific rules govern the way these pairs of entangled balls  are counted? You add a 
normal red ball in an Entanglement urn. It is then necessary to increment the number of red balls 
present in the urn. On the other hand, the total number of green balls is unaffected. But what when you 
add in the Entanglement urn the red ball of a pair of entangled balls? In that case, the linked green ball 
of the same pair of entangled balls is also added instantly in the urn. Hence, when you add a red ball of 
a pair of entangled balls in the urn, it also occurs that you add at the same time its linked green ball. 
So, in that case, you must not only increment the total number of red balls, but also the total number of 
green balls present in the urn. In the same way, if you withdraw a normal red ball from the urn, you 
simply decrement the total number of red balls of the urn, and the number of green balls in the urn is 
unaffected.  But  if  you  remove  the  red  ball  (resp.  green)  of  a  pair  of  entangled  balls,  you  must 
decrement the total number of red balls (resp. green) present in the urn as well as the total number of 
green balls (resp. red). 
At this  very moment,  the experimenter  happens again and withdraws all  balls  from the urn.  He 
announces that you are going to participate in the following experiment: 
The  Entanglement  urn* A fair  coin  will  be  randomly  tossed.  If  the  coin  lands  Heads,  the 
experimenter will put a normal red ball in the urn. On the other hand, if the coin lands Tails, he will 
put a pair of entangled balls in the urn, composed of a red ball and a green ball, both indissociably 
linked. The experimenter also adds that the room will be put in absolute darkness, and that you will 
therefore be completely unable to detect the colour of the balls, no more that you will be able to 
know, when you will have withdrawn a ball from the urn, whether it is a normal ball, or a ball 
which is part of a pair of entangled balls. The experimenter tosses the coin and while you catch a 
ball from the urn, he asks you to assess the likelihood that the coin felt Heads.
2. The Sleeping Beauty problem
Consider now the well-known  Sleeping Beauty problem (Elga 2000, Lewis 2001). Sleeping Beauty 
learns that she will be put into sleep on Sunday by some researchers. A fair coin will be tossed and if 
the coin lands Heads, Beauty will be awaken once on Monday. On the other hand, if the coin lands 
Tails, Beauty will be awaken twice: on Monday and on Tuesday. After each waking, she will be put 
into sleep again and she will forget that waking. Furthermore, once awakened, Beauty will have no 
idea of whether it is Monday or Tuesday. On awakening on Monday, what should then be Beauty's 
credence that the coin did land Heads?
At this step, one obvious first answer (I) goes as follows: since the coin is fair, the initial probability 
that the coin lands Head is 1/2. But during the course of the experiment, Sleeping Beauty does not get 
any novel information. Hence, the probability of Heads still remains 1/2.
By contrast, an alternative reasoning (II) runs as follows. Suppose the experiment is repeated many 
times, say, to fix ideas, 1000 times. Then there will be approximately 500 Heads-wakings on Monday, 
500 Tails-wakings on Monday and 500 Tails-wakings on Tuesday.  Hence, the reasoning goes,  the 
probability of Heads equals 500/1500 = 1/3. 
The argument  for  1/2 and the  argument for  1/3 yield conflicting conclusions.  And the  Sleeping 
Beauty problem is usually presented as a problem arising from conflicting conclusions resulting from 
the two above-mentioned competing lines of reasoning aiming at assigning the probability of Heads 
once Beauty is awaken. I shall argue, however, that this statement of the Sleeping Beauty problem is 
restrictive and that we need to envisage the issue from a wider perspective. For present purposes, the 
Sleeping Beauty problem is the issue of calculating properly (i) the probability of Heads (resp. Tails) 
once  Beauty is  awaken;  (ii)  the  probability  of  waking  on  Monday (resp.  Tuesday);  and  (iii)  the 
probability of Heads (resp. Tails) on waking on Monday. From the halfer perspective, the probability 
of waking on Monday equals 3/4, and the  probability of  waking on Tuesday is 1/4. By contrast, from 
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the  thirder's  perspective,  the  probability of  waking on Monday equals  2/3  and  the  probability of 
waking on Tuesday is 1/3.
But the argument for 1/2 and for 1/3 also have their own account of conditional probabilities. To 
begin with, the probability of Heads on waking on Tuesday is not a subject of disagreement, for it 
equals 0 in both accounts. The same goes for the probability of Tails on waking on Tuesday, since it 
equals 1 from the halfer's or from the thirder's viewpoint. But agreement stops when one considers the 
probability  of  Heads  on  waking  on  Monday.  For  it  equals  2/3  for  a  halfer  but  from a  thirder's 
perspective, it amounts to 1/2. On the other hand, the probability of Tails on waking on Monday is 1/3 
from a halfer standpoint, and 1/2 for a thirder.
3. The urn analogy
In what follows, I shall present an ontological solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem, which rests 
basically on the Entanglement urn experiment. A specific feature of this account is that it incorporates 
insights from the halfer and thirder standpoints, a line of resolution initiated by Nick Bostrom (2007) 
that has recently inspired some new contributions (Groisman 2008, Delabre 2008)1. 
The argument for 1/3 and the argument for 1/2 rest basically on an urn analogy. This analogy is made 
explicit in the argument for 1/3 but is less transparent in the argument for 1/2. The argument for 1/3, to 
begin with, is based on an urn analogy which associates the situation inherent to the Sleeping Beauty 
experiment with an urn that contains, in the long run (assuming that the experiment is repeated, say, 
1000 times), 500 red balls (Heads-wakings on Monday), 500 red balls (Tails-wakings on Monday) and 
500 green balls (Tails-wakings on Tuesday), i.e. 1000 red balls and 500 green balls. In this context, the 
probability of Heads upon awakening is determined by the ratio of the number of Heads-wakings to 
the total number of wakings. Hence, P(Heads) = 500/1500 =1/3. The balls in the urn are normal ones 
and for present purposes, it is worth calling this sort of urn a “standard urn”.
On the other hand, the argument for 1/2 is also based on an urn analogy, albeit less transparently. It is 
worth rendering this analogy more apparent. For this purpose, let us investigate how the calculation of 
the probability of drawing a red ball is handled by the argument for 1/2. If the coin lands Heads then 
the probability of drawing a red ball is 1, and if it lands Tails then this latter probability equals 1/2. We 
get then accordingly the probability of drawing a red ball (Monday-waking): P(R) = 1 x 1/2 + 1/2 x 
1/2 = 3/4. By contrast, if the coin land Tails, we calculate as follows the probability of drawing a green 
ball (Tuesday-waking): P(G) = 0 x 1/2 + 1/2 x 1/2 = 1/4. To sum up, according to the argument for 1/3: 
P(R) = 3/4 and P(G) = 1/4. Suppose the Sleeping beauty experiment is iterated. Now it appears that the 
argument for 1/2 is based on an analogy with a standard urn that contains 3/4 of red balls and 1/4 of 
green ones. These balls are also normal ones and the analogy underlying the argument for 1/2 is also 
with a “standard urn”.
Both above-mentioned analogies are based on a standard urn. But at this step, a question arises: is the 
analogy with the  standard urn well-suited to the Sleeping Beauty experiment? In other terms, isn't 
another  urn  model  best  suited?  In  the  present  context,  this  alternative  can  be  formulated  more 
accurately as follows:  isn't  the situation inherent  to the  Sleeping Beauty experiment  better  put  in 
analogy with the Entanglement urn*, rather than with the standard urn? I shall argue, however, that 
the analogy with the standard urn is mistaken, for it fails to incorporate an essential feature of the 
experiment, namely the fact that Monday-Tails wakings are indissociable from Tuesday-Tails wakings. 
For in the Tails case, Beauty cannot wake up on Monday without also waking up on Tuesday and 
reciprocally, she cannot wake up on Tuesday without also waking up on Monday. The argument for 
1/3 and the argument for 1/2 are thus based on an analogy with a standard urn.
In the argument for 1/3 and the argument for 1/2, one feels intuitively entitled to add red-Heads 
(Heads-wakings on Monday), red-Tails (Tails-wakings on Monday) and green-Tails (Tails-wakings on 
Tuesday) balls to compute frequencies. But red-Heads and red-Tails balls appear to be objects of a 
fundamentally different nature in the present context.  In effect,  red-Heads balls are in all  respects 
similar to our familiar objects, and can be considered properly as single objects. By contrast, it appears 
that red-Tails balls are quite indissociable from green-Tails balls. For we cannot draw a red-Tails ball 
1 Bostrom opens the path to a third way out to the Sleeping Beauty problem: “At any rate, one might hope that 
having a third contender  for  how Beauty should reason will  help stimulate  new ideas  in the study of  self-
location”.  In  his  account,  Bostrom sides  with  the  halfer  on  P(Heads)  and  with  the  thirder  on  conditional 
probabilities, but his treatment has some counter-intuitive consequences on conditional probabilities.
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without picking the associated green-Tails ball. And conversely, we cannot draw a green-Tails ball 
without picking the associated red-Tails ball. In this sense, red-Tails balls and the associated green-
Tails balls do not behave as our familiar objects, but are much similar to entangled quantum objects. 
For  Monday-Tails  wakings  are  indissociable  from Tuesday-Tails  wakings.  And  Beauty cannot  be 
awaken on Monday (resp. Tuesday) without being also awaken on Tuesday (resp. Monday). From this 
viewpoint, it is mistaken to consider red-Tails and green-Tails balls as separate objects. The correct 
intuition is that the red-Tails and the associated green-Tails  ball  are a pair of  entangled balls and 
constitute but one single object. In this context, red-Tails and green-Tails balls are best seen intuitively 
as constituents and mere parts of one single object. In other words, red-Heads balls and, on the other 
hand, red-Tails and green-Tails balls, cannot be considered as objects of the same type for probability 
purposes. And this situation justifies the fact that one is not entitled to add unrestrictedly red-Heads, 
red-Tails and green-Tails balls to compute probability frequencies. For in this case, one adds objects of 
intrinsically different types, i.e. one single object with the mere part of another single object.
Given what precedes, the correct analogy, I contend, is with an Entanglement urn that contains 2/3 of 
red balls and 1/3 of green balls. And among the red balls, 1/2 are normal balls, but 1/2 are entangled 
ones, each being associated with a different green ball. As will become clearer later, this new analogy 
incorporates the strengths of both above-mentioned analogies with the standard urn.
4. Consequences of the analogy with the Entanglement urn
At this step, it is worth drawing the consequences of the analogy with the  Entanglement  urn, that 
notably result  from the  ontological  properties  of  the  balls.  Now the key point  appears  to  be  the 
following one. Consider the Entanglement urn. Recall that there are in total 2/3 of red balls and 1/3 of 
green balls in the Entanglement urn, and that nothing seemingly distinguishes the normal balls from 
the entangled ones. Among the red balls, half are normal ones, but the other half is composed of balls 
that  are each entangled with a different  green ball.  If  one considers the behaviour of the balls,  it 
appears that normal red balls behave as usual. But entangled ones do behave differently, with regard to 
statistics. Suppose I add the red ball of an entangled pair in the Entanglement urn. Then I also add 
instantly in the urn the associated green ball of the entangled pair. Suppose, conversely, that I remove 
the red ball of an entangled pair from the urn. Then I also remove instantly the associated green ball. 
Now the same goes for Sleeping Beauty, as the analogy suggests. And the consequences are not so that 
innocuous.  What  is  the  probability  of  a  Monday-waking?  This  is  tantamount  to  calculating  the 
probability P(R→) of  drawing a red ball from the Entanglement urn? On Heads, the probability of 
drawing a red ball is 1. On Tails, we can either draw the red or the green ball of an entangled pair. But 
it should be pointed out that if we pick on Tails the green ball of an entangled pair, we also draw 
instantly the associated red ball. Hence, the probability of drawing a red ball on Tails is also 1. Thus, 
P(R→) = 1 x 1/2 + 1 x 1/2 = 1. Conversely, what is the probability of a waking on Tuesday? This is 
tantamount to the probability P(G→) of drawing a green ball. The probability of drawing a green ball 
is 0 in the Heads case, and 1 in the Tails case. For in the latter case, we either draw the green or the red 
ball of an entangled pair. But even if we draw the red ball of the entangled pair, we draw then instantly 
the associated green ball. Hence, P(G→) = 0 x 1/2 + 1 x 1/2 = 1/2. To sum up: P(R→) = 1 and P(G→) 
= 1/2. The probability of a waking on Monday is then 1, and the probability of a waking on Tuesday is 
1/2. Now it appears that P(R→) + P(G→) = 1 + 1/2 = 1,5. In the present account, this results from the 
fact that drawing a red ball and drawing a green ball – in general – are not exclusive events. And – in 
particular  – drawing a red ball  and drawing a green ball  from an entangled pair are  not exclusive 
events for  probability purposes.  For we cannot  draw the red-Tails  (resp.  green-Tails)  ball  without 
drawing the associated green-Tails (resp. red-Tails) ball.
On the other hand, as mentioned above, there are unambiguously 2/3 of red balls and 1/3 of green 
balls in total in the urn. This casts light on the fact that we need to distinguish two different situations 
with regard to the Entanglement urn: the probability P(R↑) of a red ball  being in the urn; and the 
probability P(R→) of  drawing a red ball. For as we did see it, the former equals 2/3 and the latter 
equals 1. And the same goes for green balls: the probability P(G↑) of a green ball being in the urn is 
1/3 and the probability P(G→) of drawing a green ball equals 1/2. In sum, from an internal viewpoint, 
the probability of a red (resp. green) ball being in the urn is 2/3 (resp. 1/3) in the Entanglement urn. By 
contrast, from an external viewpoint, the probability of drawing a red (resp. green) ball from the the 
urn is 1 (resp. 1/2). The same goes analogously for Sleeping Beauty: we need to distinguish (i) from an 
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internal point of view, the probability of being on Monday (to say it otherwise, the probability that this 
waking is a Monday-waking); and (ii) from an  external standpoint, the probability of a waking on 
Monday.
Let us forget for a moment the fact that, according to its classical formulation, the Sleeping Beauty 
problem arises from conflicting conclusions resulting from the argument for 1/3 and the argument for 
1/2 on calculating the probability of Heads once Beauty is awaken. This could be a red herring. For as 
we did see it before, the problem also arises on the calculation of the probability of waking on Monday 
(drawing a red ball), where conflicting conclusions also result from concurrent lines of reasoning: Elga 
argues  for  2/3  and  Lewis  for  3/4.  Hence,  the  Sleeping  Beauty  problem  could  then  have  been 
formulated alternatively as follows: once awaken, what probability should Beauty assign to waking on 
Monday (drawing a red ball)? 
What  is  now the response of  the  present  account,  based on the  Entanglement  urn,  to  the  latter 
question? In the present context, we need then to distinguish between two different questions: (i) what 
is the probability of drawing a red ball (a Monday-waking)? And (ii) what is the probability that this 
ball  is  a  red one (this  waking is  a Monday-waking)? This distinction makes sense in  the  present 
context, since it results from the properties of the entangled balls. In particular, this richer semantics 
results from the case where you draw the green ball of an entangled pair from the urn. For in this case, 
this ball is not a red one, but it occurs that you also draw a red ball, since the associated red ball will 
be drawn simultaneously.  Now it  appears that the response to the first  question equals 1, since it 
corresponds to the probability P(R→) of drawing a red ball (a Monday-waking). And the probability 
P(G→) of drawing a green ball (a Tuesday-waking) also equals 1/2. On the other hand, the response to 
the second question turns out to be different. For the probability P(R↑) that this ball is a red one (this 
waking is a Monday-waking), as we did see it, equals 1/3. And the probability P(G↑) that this ball is a 
green one (this waking is a Tuesday-waking), equals 2/3.
5. A two-sided account
Grounded as they are on an unsuited analogy with the standard urn, both arguments do have, however, 
their own strengths. In particular, the analogy with the urn in the argument for 1/3 does justice to the 
fact that the Sleeping Beauty experiment leads to a choice between three wakings (Heads-waking, 
Tails-waking on Monday, Tails-waking on Tuesday), each corresponding to a different ball in the urn. 
On the other hand, the analogy with the urn in the argument for 1/2 handles adequately the fact that the 
Heads-waking is put on a par with the two Tails-wakings. Nevertheless, these two analogies are one-
sided and fail to handle the whole notion of the probability of drawing a red ball (waking on Monday). 
In the present account, the analogy with the Entanglement urn proves to be two-sided and encapsulates 
both insights. For on the one hand, there are 2/3 of red balls and 1/3 of green balls in the urn, in the 
same way as with the thirder's urn. It appears then that the probability P(R↑) that this drawn ball is red, 
in the present account, corresponds to the thirder's insight. On the other hand, the halfer's insight is 
also taken into account, since the normal red ball is put on a par with a pair of entangled balls, which 
behave as one single object. This casts light on the fact that  the probability P(R→) of drawing a red 
ball, in the present account, is the mere transposition of the halfer's intuition. Recall then the halfer's 
calculation: P(R) = 1 x 1/2 + 1/2 x 1/2 = 3/4 and P(G) = 0 x 1/2 + 1/2 x 1/2 = 1/4. Now the present 
standpoint  echoes  this  reasoning,  by  only  pondering  the  calculation  with  the  properties  of  the 
entangled balls: P(R→) = 1 x 1/2 + 1 x 1/2 = 1 and P(G→) = 0 x 1/2 + 1 x 1/2 = 1/2. In sum, it appears 
that the probability P(R↑) that this drawn ball is red does justice to the thirder's intuition, and that the 
probability P(R→) of drawing a red ball vindicates the halfer's insight. At this step, it appears that the 
present account is two-sided, since it incorporates insights from the argument for 1/3 and from the 
argument for 1/2. 
Now what  precedes  casts  new light  on the  halfer  and the  thirder's  accounts.  For  given that  the 
Sleeping Beauty experiment, is modelled with a standard urn, both accounts lack the ability to express 
the  difference between the  probability P(R→) of  drawing a  red ball  (a  Monday-waking)  and the 
probability P(R↑) that this drawn ball is red (this waking is a Monday-waking). For it does not make 
sense in the standard urn, since these probabilities are equal in the latter model. Consequently, there is 
a failure to express this difference in the analogy with the standard urn. But such distinction makes 
sense in the Sleeping Beauty experiment and in the analogy with the Entanglement urn. For in the 
5
richer ontology that  results  from this  two-sided model,  the distinction between P(R→) and P(R↑) 
yields two different results: P(R→) = 1 and P(R↑) = 2/3.
At this step, it  is worth recalling the diagnosis of the Sleeping Beauty problem made by Benoit 
Groisman (2008). Groisman attributes the two conflicting responses to the probability of Heads to an 
ambiguity in the protocol of the Sleeping Beauty experiment. He argues that the argument for 1/2 is an 
adequate response to the probability of Heads on awakening, under the setup of coin tossing. On the 
other hand, he considers that the argument for 1/3 is an accurate answer to the latter probability, under 
the setup of picking up a ball from the urn. Groisman also considers that putting a ball in the box and 
picking out  a ball  out  from the box are two different  events,  that  lead therefore to  two different 
probabilities. In the present account, though, putting a ball in the urn is no different from drawing a 
ball from the urn. For if we put a red ball of an entangled pair in the urn, we also put immediately the 
associated green ball. Rather, from the present standpoint, being in the urn is probabilistically different 
from withdrawing (or putting) a ball in the urn. The present account and Groisman's analysis share the 
same overall direction, although the details of our motivations are significantly different.
As we did see it, the calculation of the probability of drawing a red ball (waking on Monday) is the 
core issue in the Sleeping Beauty problem. But what is now the response of the present account on 
conditional  probabilities and on the probability of  Heads upon awakening? Let  us begin with the 
conditional probability of Heads on a Monday-waking. Let us recall first how it is calculated on the 
two concurrent standard lines of reasoning. To begin with, the probability P(Heads|G) of Heads on 
drawing a green ball is not a subject of disagreement for halfers and thirders, since it equals 0 in both 
accounts. The same goes for the probability P(Tails|G) of Tails on drawing a green ball, since it equals 
1 from a halfer or thirder viewpoint. But agreement stops when one considers the probability P(Heads|
R) of Heads on drawing a red ball. For P(Heads|R) = 2/3 for a halfer and P(Heads|R) = 1/2 from a 
thirder's perspective. On the other hand, the probability P(Tails|R) of Tails on drawing a red ball is 1/3 
from a  halfer  standpoint,  and  1/2  for  a  thirder.  Now the  response  of  the  present  account  to  the 
calculation of the conditional probability of Heads on a Monday-waking parallels the answer made to 
the issue of determining the probability of waking on Monday (drawing a red ball). In the present 
account, P(Heads|G) = 0 and P(Tails|G) = 1, as usual. But we need to distinguish between P(Heads|
R→) and P(Heads|R↑), to go any further. For P(Heads|R→) is the probability of Heads on drawing of 
a red ball. And P(Heads|R↑) is the probability of Heads on this ball being a red one. Now we get 
accordingly:  P(Heads|R→) =  [P(Heads)  x  P(R→|Heads)]  /  P(R→) =  [1/2  x   1]  /  1  =   1/2.  The 
reasoning  parallels  the  halfer's  standpoint,  but  takes  additionally  into  account  the  property  of 
entanglement. And we also get: P(Tails|R→) = [P(Tails) x P(R→|Tails)] / P(R→) = [1/2 x 1] / 1 =  1/2. 
On the other hand, P(Heads|R↑) is calculated in the same way as in the thirder's account. And we get 
then accordingly: P(Heads|R↑) = 1/2 and P(Tails|R↑) = 1/2.
Now the  same  goes  for  the  probability  of  Heads  upon  awakening.  For  there  are  two  different 
responses  in  the  present  account,  depending  on  whether  one  considers  P(R→)  or  P(R↑).  If  one 
envisages things from the viewpoint  of P(R→), the probability of  drawing a red ball  (a Monday-
waking), then it ensues, in the same way as in the halfer's account, that there is no shift in the prior 
probability of Heads. It ensues, that the probability of Heads (resp. Tails) on awakening still remains 
1/2. On the other hand, if one considers P(R↑), the probability of Heads upon awakening is calculated 
in the same way as in the argument for 1/3, and we get accordingly: P(Heads↑) = 1/3 and P(Tails↑) = 
2/3.
Finally, the above results are summarised in the following table:
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halfer thirder present  
account
P(Heads→) 1/2 1/2
P(Tails→) 1/2 1/2
P(Heads↑) 1/3 1/3
P(Tails↑) 2/3 2/3
P(a Monday-waking) ≡ P(R→) 3/4 1
P(a Tuesday-waking) ≡ P(G→) 1/4 1/2
P(this waking is a Monday-waking) ≡ P(R↑) 2/3 2/3
P(this waking is a Monday-waking) ≡ P(G↑) 1/3 1/3
P(Heads| a Monday-waking) ≡ P(Heads|R→) 2/3 1/2
P(Tails| a Monday-waking) ≡ P(Tails|R→) 1/3 1/2
P(Heads| this waking is Monday-waking) ≡ P(Heads|R↑) 1/2 1/2
P(Tails| this waking is a Monday-waking) ≡ P(Tails|R↑) 1/2 1/2
6. Handling the variations of the Sleeping Beauty problem
From the above, it follows that the present treatment of the Sleeping Beauty problem, is capable of 
handling several variations of the original problem which have recently flourished in the literature. For 
the above solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem applies straightforwardly, I shall argue, to these 
variations  of  the  original  experiment.  Let  us  consider,  to  begin with,  a  variation were  on Heads, 
Sleeping  Beauty  is  not  awaken  on  Monday  but  instead  on  Tuesday.  This  is  modelled  with  an 
Entanglement  urn*  that  receives  one  normal  green  ball  (instead  of  a  red  one  in  the  original 
experiment) in the Heads case.
Let us suppose, second, that  Sleeping Beauty is awaken two times on Monday in the Tails case 
(instead of being awaken on both Monday and Tuesday). This is then modelled with an Entanglement 
urn* that receives one pair of entangled balls which are composed of two red balls in the Tails case. 
(instead of a pair of entangled balls composed of a red and a green ball in the original experiment).
Let us imagine, third, that Beauty is awaken two times  – on Monday and Tuesday – in the Heads 
case, and three times – on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday – in the Tails case. This is then modelled 
with an Entanglement urn* that receives one pair of entangled balls composed of one red ball and one 
green ball  in the Heads case; in the Tails case, the Entanglement urn* is filled with one triplet of 
entangled balls, composed of a red, a green and a blue ball.
 
Finally,  the  lesson of  the  Sleeping Beauty Problem appear  to be  the following:  our current  and 
familiar objects or concepts such as balls, wakings, etc. should not be considered as the sole relevant 
classes of objects for probability purposes. We should bear in mind that according to an unformalised 
axiom of probability theory, a given situation is standardly modelled with the help of urns, dices, balls, 
etc. But the rules that allow for these simplifications lack an explicit formulation. However in certain 
situations, in order to reason properly, it is also necessary to take into account somewhat unfamiliar 
objects whose constituents are pairs of indissociable balls or of mutually inseparable wakings, etc. 
This lesson was anticipated by Nelson Goodman, who pointed out in Ways of Worldmaking that some 
objects  which  are  prima  facie  completely  different  from  our  familiar  objects  also  deserve 
consideration:  ‘we do not  welcome molecules  or  concreta as  elements  of  our everyday world,  or 
combine tomatoes and triangles and typewriters and tyrants and tornadoes into a single kind’.2 As we 
did see it, in some cases, we cannot add unrestrictedly an object of the Heads-world with an object of 
the  Tails-world.  For  despite  the  appearances,  objects  of  the  Heads-world  may have  ontologically 
different  properties  from objects  of  the  Tails-world.  And the  status  of  our  probabilistic  paradigm 
2Goodman (1978, p. 21).
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object, namely a ball, appears to be world-relative, since it can be a whole in the Heads-world and a 
part  in the Tails-world. Once this goodmanian step accomplished, we should be less vulnerable to 
certain subtle cognitive traps in probabilistic reasoning.
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